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Abstract. Hardware characterizations of integrated circuits have been
evolving rapidly with the advent of more precise, sophisticated and cost-
ecient tools. In this paper we describe how the ne tuning of a laser
source has been used to characterize, set and reset the state of registers
in a 90nm chip. By adjusting the incident laser beam's location, it is
possible to choose to switch any register value from `0' to `1' or vice-
versa by targeting the PMOS side or the NMOS side. Plus, we show how
to clear a register by selecting a laser beam's power. With the help of
imaging techniques, we are able to explain the underlying phenomenon
and provide a direct link between the laser mapping and the physical
gate structure. Thus, we correlate the localization of laser fault injec-
tions with implementations of the PMOS and NMOS areas in the silicon
substrate. This illustrates to what extent laser beams can be used to
monitor the bits stored within registers, with adverse consequences in
terms of security evaluation of integrated circuits.
Keywords: Laser fault injection, registers attacks, bit set and reset,
fault model
1 Introduction
Several attacks can be performed on integrated circuits to bypass security mech-
anisms or access sensitive data. Those attacks are usually classied into four
categories: logical attacks where the attacker exploits a weak software implemen-
tation [3]; side-channel attacks where power or electromagnetic or timing based
information are used to learn about the data manipulated by a given device
(SPA [15], DPA [11] and CPA [4]); invasive attacks where the device is physi-
cally and irreversibly modied[1]; and fault attacks where external perturbations
are used to induce faults during the execution of a given sensitive program or
on the sensitive data being manipulated [19,2]. This last kind of attack can be
performed using several means like a ash light, laser beam, electromagnetic
pulse [5], voltage or clock glitches.
In this paper we focus on the use of a laser beam as a security characteri-
zation tool for Integrated Circuits (IC): with such means, precise and localized
eects can be induced into the device without damaging the latter (usually a
simple decapsulation of the chip is enough) at relatively low costs (≈ 20Keuros),
thanks to the decreasing costs of laser sources. We describe how the precise use
of a laser beam can be used to characterize, set and reset the state of registers in
a 90nm IC. We correlate laser faults injection results with physical implementa-
tions of the PMOS and NMOS. The explanation for the observed phenomenon
is obtained by the use of imaging techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst introduce some of the hardware
design concepts used in the paper as well as some background information on
laser-based fault injection techniques. Then we describe the experimental set-up
used, the device under test (DUT) and the methodology applied. The monitoring
of registers using laser-based fault injections is then depicted: we describe the
tests performed and show the overlay between the laser fault-based mapping
and the register's physical implementation. We then discuss about our ndings
relative to recent publications, we describe limitations and future work before
concluding on how such techniques can have adverse consequences in terms of
security.
2 Hardware design aspects
2.1 IC physical layers
Integrated circuits are made out of silicon wafers. The dierent manufacturing
steps are performed on only one side of the wafer usually called the active side,
top side or front side. For our laser fault injections, we will use the other side,
called the backside, which can be thinned and polished. Either way, the nal
wafer thickness is relatively high - 100 times - compared to the active layer. This
parameter must be considered for setting up the laser.
The active layer is made, from bottom to top, of P or N doped silicon regions
to constitute a transistor's drain and source. A polysilicon layer is used to make
transistor gates with minimal dimensioning. Then, the rst metal layer is used
to connect the dierent transistors to build a logic gate. Those gates are linked
together by interconnection or supplied by power routing lines. All metal layers
are separated by insulation layers. Finally, a passive layer protects the chip from
corrosion or packaging or handling stresses.
2.2 Logic gate consideration
Integrated circuits are made up of elementary functional gate structures also
called standard cells. During the place and route phase of the circuit's design
the arrangement of standard cells is optimized to reach the best compromise
between area, timing and power constraints. In a typical secure product, basic
blocks - i.e. CPU, coprocessors, logic functions - are scrambled and are part of
the synthesized logic. Depending on the chip complexity, several thousands to
millions of logic gates are implemented. The smallest gate is the inverter which is
composed of two transistors (as we are in Complementary MOS circuit design).
The number of transistors used in other, more complex, logic gates can be ten
times larger. Basic gates function are NOT, AND, NOR, XOR, NAND and few
others like ip-ops or latches. Even if the number of logic functions provided is
relatively small, the number of basic gates available in the standard cell library
could be more than 10 times larger, depending on the number of inputs (i.e.
NAND2, NAND3), the amount of current driven or on the presence of optional
reset or clock signals. It is possible to temporarily store a single bit of data in a
register which can be either a latch or a ip-op. A latch output is constantly
aected by its input as long as the enable signal is set. On the other hand, a ip-
op updates its value only at a rising or falling edge of the enable signal which
usually is the clock signal. This article only deals with ip-ops even if it could
be extended to any CMOS based logic gate or to volatile storage structures.
2.3 Register hardware structure
Storing bits within the synthesized logic requires several transistors: about 20
to 30 transistors are needed to build a single ip-op. We focus in this paper
on bistable ip-ops that are standard cells implemented within the synthesized
logic in order to store temporary values or to speed up the data access. They
are widely used in core processor unit or in cryptographic coprocessors.
The structure of ip-ops depends on their types; i.e D type or E type (en-
able) and if there is a synchronous reset input or an asynchronous one. Typically,
for a 90nm technology a ip-op size is of the order of 15µm2 and becomes big-
ger when an enable and a reset signal are implemented. Flip-ops such as other
memory elements require specic timing requirements including set up and hold
times on data and minimum pulse widths on clock inputs [10].
The ip-op considered here is of D-type with an asynchronous reset from
which any edge-triggered type storage element can be designed with a few extra
gates. For performance, layout density and energy eciency, gates are always
designed and optimized at the transistor level. Their implementation requires
several stages: inverting input buer, two types of latches, possibly an output
multiplexer, output buers, clock preparation and asynchronous reset signal.
A basic D ip-op layout is given in Figure 1; we acknowledge that this type
of gate is more complex that those studied in previous works [16]. This ip-op
contains 24 transistors and a theoretical study of a laser beam's eect over such
a gate would require dedicated and custom tools to be able to run signicant
simulations.
3 Laser beam injection
3.1 Laser/Matter interaction in CMOS circuits
Within a single ip-op logic gate, several pairs of NMOS and PMOS transistors
are implemented. Implanting P-type dopants into some N-type base material,
Fig. 1. A ip-op layout
or vice versa, create PN junctions. Those junctions are sensitive to a photoelec-
tric eect when exposed to a laser beam [8]. This induced photocurrent may
switch a transistor's state thus aecting the output of a logic gate. Previous
works based on an inverter [16] showed that when the input is `1', the drain
of the NMOS `becomes the sensitive' part and when the input is `0' the drain
of the PMOS `becomes the sensitive' one. Moreover, depending on the type of
targeted MOS transistors the required power to switch a transistor is more or
less important [17]. Measurements made by Saraanos et al. [17] give a dierence
of photocurrent 6 times higher for a specic NMOS junction (N+/P-sub, large
ellipse) than for a PMOS one (P+/N-well, small ellipse) in 90nm technology and
for a given process.
Fig. 2. NMOS, PMOS and generated photocurrent
In [18], the author also notes that the N-well/P-sub junction (present only for
PMOS transistors as seen in Figure 2) despite having the largest surface, creates
a small photocurrent. Furthermore, as our shoot duration is superior to tens of
ns, we use the model given for a shoot duration over 8ns and in this model, even
if pnp associations are present, currents created with parasite bipolar junction
transistors are neglected. Without any knowledge of our ip-op layout, based
on these previous works, we can guess that a bit initialized at `1' would be more
sensitive to a laser beam. Indeed, as PMOS transistors are connected to the
upper rail voltage and NMOS ones to the lower rail voltage, reaching a `0' value
might be performed through the switching of the state of one or several NMOS
transistors.
3.2 Laser based fault attacks
The laser bench used to perform faults in integrated circuits evaluation is char-
acterized by:
 High spatial precision
 Local eect area
 Accurate timing
 High fault repeatability
 Multiple faults capability
Thus, using laser fault injections, several types of attacks are feasible against
cryptographic operations: such as safe error attacks where the attacker can
guess for example key value by observing the output after a single bit modica-
tion [14,13]; algorithm modication attacks [6] where the attacker can change a
single bit of a register and reduce, for instance, the number of rounds performed
in a cryptographic algorithm; and dierential fault attacks [7] where an attacker
can exploit fault injections to guess a key. This paper deals with the laser eect
over a complex logic gate.
4 Experimental set-up
4.1 Device under test and methodology
In our experiments, we use a recent IC microcontroller with a technology node
of 90nm. We focus our investigations onto the synthesized logic of the sample
covering about a fourth of the global integrated circuit's size. Due to dense metal
routing on the top side of the chip, we decided to use backside analysis in order
to ensure that a uniform laser power reaches the active layer. Thus, the DUT's
backside is opened and then placed under the microscope which focuses the
laser beam through the substrate. The DUT is monitored and we perform the
following experimental operations:
 A. Load data register.
 B. Perform laser shoot.
 C. Read back register value.
 D. Move XY stage and perform A/B/C repeatedly.
Using an open sample, we only read a unique register value. The resulting
output le is a matrix of the faulted XY positions which displays only the faults
injected into this single register.
4.2 Laser platform
The laser test platform is composed of a microscope with dierent focusing
capabilities, a laser cavity, an electrically controlled XYZ stage, an oscilloscope,
a device under test (DUT) and electronic boards to drive the dierent equipments
and to precisely synchronize them together. The set up must be well dened in
terms of:
 Pulse shape and characteristics such as wavelength, energy, duration.
 Pulse repeatability.
 Spatial localization on the chip.
 Temporal localization in the process (not really applicable for static registers
approach though).
Our platform enables us to measure the power reaching the integrated cir-
cuit's backside. We measured this for each input command value applied to our
laser source. This output power can vary from few mW to 800mW peak and we
can set the pulse duration as short as tens of ns. According to power measure-
ments and oscilloscope signal observations, we can measure the energy reaching
the backside surface of the die.
E = Ppeak ∗∆T
E(Joules) = Ppeak(W ) ∗∆T (s)
We use a 1064nm laser wavelength that enables us to obtain a trade-o in
terms of photoelectric eect and substrate absorption [9]. The optical absorption
of a laser beam in the silicon depends on the substrate doping concentration and
the wavelength used. Our set up has a spatial precision of the order of the µm.
5 Monitoring register bits using a laser beam
In the rest of this paper, we assume that timing constraints are not an issue as
we perturb a static register which stores the programmed data during the entire
execution of our process. The hardware design of those registers does not include
a dynamic return to the previous value so we can fault a register at any time,
and then read the value back. Within the following subsections we describe how
to nd a register location over the entire DUT (5.1), how a localized laser beam
can control the bit value (5.2), how the bit value can be obtained with a laser
mapping (5.3) and how a power controlled laser beam can clear a register value
(5.4).
5.1 Finding the area of interest
The entire synthesized logic block is scanned with a large step (around 25µm)
and a large beam spot (around 10µm). This allows nding the bits of interest over
the entire chip. Some bits are missing as we attack with a large scanning step. We
also obtain multiple-bit faults with such energy and spot sizes. However, once a
register bit is found, chances are high of nding all the others nearby, even if the
synthesized logic scrambles the structure. The precision of our experimental set-
up is the key point for the success of our experiments. After empirical tests, we
found a set up for a hundred percent faults injection success rate by applying an
energy of tens of nJ on the backside of the circuit. With these laser parameters,
no particular alarm is triggered by the chip.
For the rest of our experiments, we limit the area of interest to the area where
some bits of the register have been revealed. This area becomes the new region
to scan. Thus, the next gures only display a small part of the integrated circuit.
This is less time consuming, more attacks can be performed with dierent sets of
parameters. After nding this area of interest, we then use a smaller step (around
1µm) and a smaller laser spot size (around 2µm). We increase the magnication
with a 50× objective and we target an area of 30× 38µm2. The laser scans are
performed with an X and Y step of 1µm. We hence have 30×38 = 1140 positions
to analyze.
5.2 Controlling the modication of a register by localization
A ip-op is usually implemented using a large number of transistors and there
are only two values that can be stored in a ip-op logic gate, a `1' or a `0'.
Fig. 3. `0' to `1' bits faults, `1' to `0' bits faults, `1' to `0' and `0' to `1'
Over the reduced scan area dened in (5.1), only 8 bits are implemented, and
for the rst scan on the left of Figure 3, we set the register value with `00000000'
before scanning the 30× 38µm2. As the registers are all programmed with a `0'
value, we are only able to detect when the laser shoot switches the output value
to `1'. As naming convention we talk about `reset' or `bit reset' when the value
switches from `1' to `0' and `set' or `bit set' when the value switches from `0'
to `1'. In the gures to come, the grey or black squares represent a bit switch
whereas white pixels are used when no error is recorded. For the middle part of
Figure 3, inversely we set the initial register bits with `1's. It gives us another
mapping on which we see the positions where the laser beam switches a bit to
`0'. Both mappings put together give the superposed representation on the
rightmost picture of the gure.
We thus localize characteristic patterns: for each bit set in Figure 3 for in-
stance, we get a specic location where the laser could be applied to change
the bit value. 8 distinguishable locations are found, one for each of the 8 register
bits. With the second mapping we get the same status to have bit reset. However
with the third part of the image we can say that bit set or bit reset sensitive
areas are distinct areas. As another result, if we assume that the same logic gate
is used for all the bits, we also get some information about pattern rotation. For
instance if bit number 1 has a reference rotation, then bit number 3 is mirrored.
We thus suppose the ip-op gate physical implantation to be mirrored. For
each of those eight logic gates, using one laser shoot targeting the right sensitive
positions, we can exactly control the stored value at the logic gate output.
In Figure 4, we show that half of the bits present over this area have their
bit set sensitive part on the left side of the reset sensitive part. This gives some
information about the orientation of each logic gate.
Fig. 4. Logic gates orientation
5.3 Dierentiating register bit values with laser mapping
Figure 5 shows the mapping of faulted values that were observed for 4 dierent
initial settings of the 8-bit register. In the upper left picture, the register is
programmed with all zeros. In the upper right picture, all ones are written before
performing the laser scanning. The pattern `11110000' is written in the case of
the lower left picture and in the lower right one, `00001111' is programmed in
the register.
We observe that the bit set and bit reset have dierent sensitivities. The ob-
servation of the location where the faults occurred gives direct information about
the initial value of the bit. In our tests the larger sensitive areas correspond to
an initial state at `0' and the smaller ones are representative of an initial state
of `1'.
Fig. 5. Laser fault injection mappings at 39nJ with dierent initial values; top-left:
`00000000', top-right: `11111111', bottom-left: `11110000', bottom-right: `00001111'
5.4 Controlled register clearing by power selection
We observed that the laser location can be tuned to change in a controlled way
the stored value in a register ip-op. So, another test campaign was conducted
to nd if other laser parameters can be used to increase our capabilities to change
registers' contents in a controlled way. Therefore, we set the initial register value
to `00001111' and consecutively change the laser exposure time and the laser
beam power, resulting in a successively decreasing the energy. If we look at the
pictures from the left to the right in Figure 6, the energy hitting the chip's
backside is successively 32nJ , 13nJ and 10nJ .
Fig. 6. Pertubation of the register initialized at `00001111' with dierent energies; left:
32nJ , middle: 13nJ , right: 10nJ
Figure 6 shows that a careful control (an energy high enough to perturb a type
of transistors without perturbing the other type of transistors) of the injected
energy only allows to reset bits and to let bit initialized at `0' unchanged. The
contents can be controlled very precisely with this set up. Using a large spot size
and adequate energy, an attacker could clear all the bits of the ip-ops present
under the laser beam.
A sensitivity map is drawn from the experiments done, it well illustrates
obtained eects depending on the level of energy applied. Obviously, table 1 is
valid over this given circuit and for the spot size and wavelength used.
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Table 1. Observed eect depending on level of energy hitting the circuit backside
6 Correlating fault attacks and transistors
implementation
The eects depicted in the previous sections are linked to the underlying hard-
ware implementation. Based on the results of the dierent laser injection eects
obtained on the chip, we decided to implement an invasive approach on a second
identical sample. For that purpose, the chip is rst depackaged with nitric acid.
Then, the device is dipped into a hydrouoric acid bath, and then rinsed with
water to remove all metal and oxide layers. The chip is dried before performing
scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image acquisition. Figure 7 is the bulk
level picture of the area scanned during our laser tests. `8' columns of logic gates
are visible and the P-well or N-well active areas - representative of CMOS pro-
cess - of each column can be easily distinguished. In the same picture, a logic
gate is highlighted by a black rectangle whereas the white circle gives an idea of
the size of the laser spot used (≈ 2µm).
In CMOS circuits the output current of PMOS or NMOS transistors can be
approximated by I ≈ µp,n ∗ W/L where µ is the mobility of the carriers, W
and L respectively the width and length of the transistor gate. L is xed by
Fig. 7. N and P-well implementation, single gate and spot size representation
Fig. 8. Laser faults mapping overlaid on Scanning Electron Microscope image
the technology node. This output current must be balanced. So, this is partially
realized by adjusting the W parameter. The mobility µp of the hole carriers
is smaller than that of the electrons µn. So, the width of the gate of PMOS
transistors must be larger. On the SEM image, this property is used to clearly
identify PMOS or NMOS location.
If the laser fail map is overlaid with the SEM image (Figure 8), we can directly see
that the relative locations of the bit set (white squares) or bit reset areas (black
squares) within a gate are respectively over the PMOS area and the NMOS area.
In addition, for the energy of laser shoot, the sensitive area is larger when the
bit is initially programmed at `1' (bit reset, black squares). For the ip-op gate
used in the analyzed register, shooting with the laser on the NMOS will reset
the bit whereas shooting on the PMOS will set the bit from `0' to `1'.
7 Discussion and future work
Comparison to SRAM fault model and generated junction photocurrent: The
work of Roscian et al. [16] targeted a SRAM memory element with a valid bit
set and bit reset model. In their work the experimental results are in line with
the electrical simulations performed. In our work we target a more complex gate
where the layout of the ip-op and the logic gate transistors schematic were
not available. Moreover, we showed a strong dependency between laser fault in-
jection behavior and PMOS or NMOS areas. In addition, we also validated this
model on a more recent technology - 90nm vs 0.25µm - used in current standard
smart card devices.
In [17], Saraanos et al. observed a dierence between the generated photocur-
rents over an NMOS pn junction and those over a PMOS pn junction. This result
is also conrmed by our results as NMOS transistors reveal a higher sensitivity.
Limitations and future works: As the internal design of the gate studied was
unknown and as our laser spot size was not capable of targeting a single transistor
it is impossible to validate this experimental result with electrical simulations.
For example, the number of transistors disturbed by the laser eect is unknown.
The contribution of each disturbed transistor to the nal ip-op switching is
missing. This knowledge is very signicant for a designer who wants to make
a standard cell more resistant against laser attacks. The future work will be to
reproduce the same experiments on a device where all the data of the standard
cell used for bit storage registers are available. Simulations and deeper fault
modeling at transistor and gate level would also be possible.
Threats and countermeasures: Our experiments reveal a threat introduced by
the capability of controlling the values of registers bits with a proper laser set
up. As an evolution of the work of Leveugle et al. [12], and from an attackers
point of view, bit set, bit reset or register reset could now be considered as re-
ally practicable fault models, even on very recent semiconductor technologies.
We can reasonably think that state of the art cryptographic implementations
are protected against safe errors or DFA but vulnerabilities introduced on other
sensitive registers must be carefully analyzed. If no existing hardware counter-
measures - such as hardware redundancy - are provided by the device to protect
against registers modications, the software must monitor those registers' in-
tegrity frequently. For example, randomly check of register coherence could be
performed before and after sensitive operations. This may imply signicant per-
formances loss though.
8 Conclusion
We present in this paper the realization of practical laser tests performed on a
90nm device. Our initial target was to analyze the eect of the laser beam on
ip-ops of a register and to reach the limits provided by our equipment. We
highlight that a reliable fault injection requires to perfectly monitor the laser
beam positioning, the laser beam size and the laser pulse parameters. With the
correct set up, it is possible to control with a 100% success rate the fault injection
eect on a single bit: `0' to `1' or `1' to `0'. We also succeed in tuning our laser
parameters to only reset the register bits initialized at `1' whereas register bits
with initial value at `0' are left unchanged. Finally, we correlate the laser fault
mapping with the physical image of the area under test. With this observation,
we are able to explain that the dierence of sensitivity is due to the nature of the
active area (PMOS or NMOS) exposed within the standard cell. This latest result
shows the interest for security characterization to use laser beam sizes smaller
than the logical gate's width. The fault models usually used in cryptographic
attacks - e.g. safe errors, register reset - are validated by the present study. High
injection rates with ne tuned laser beam increase the requirements of strong
software or hardware counter measures against fully controlled faults.
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